Strategic abandonment by Sneider, Daniel

CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
U.S.-ROK Security Relations
Strategic Abandonment: Alliance Relations in Northeast Asia in the Post-Iraq Era
Daniel Sneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Korea’s Domestic Base for Alliance with the United States
Lee Sook-Jong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S.-ROK Economic Relations
Issues in U.S.-ROK Economic Relations
Kozo Kiyota and Robert Stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Cultural Integration Between the United States and Korea: Looking Beyond the
Free Trade Agreement
Mo Jongryn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
Can a Deal Be Done? The DPRK Nuclear Question Revisited
Lessons from the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Gregory F. Treverton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
“Peace in Our Time” at What Cost? Possible Financial and Legal Implications of
Denuclearizing North Korea
Scott Rembrandt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A Real Deal or a Political Masquerade? The North Korean Nuclear Question
Revisited
Lee Jung-hoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
East Asia’s Economic and Security Regionalism: Old Constraints and New Prospects
Turning the Six-Party Talks into a Multilateral Security Framework for
Northeast Asia
Gilbert Rozman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Korean Soft Power: Transnational Cultural Flows, Korean Film, and Diplomacy
in East Asia
“Guests” of the Dear Leader: Shin Sang-ok, Choi Eun-hee, and North Korea’s
Cultural Crisis
Kim Suk-young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195
Remember Me, Remember Us, Remember Korea: Hallyu, Flashbacks, and the
Transformation of South Korea Into an Unforgettable Nation
Aaron Han Joon Magnan-Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
         Towards Sustainable Economic & Security Relations in East Asia: U.S. & ROK Policy Options     1
STRATEGIC ABANDONMENT:





II. The Vietnam War Era: The Historical Precedent
III. Abandonment Fears after the North Korean Nuclear Test
IV. Korea: Between Entanglement and Abandonment
V. Conclusion: Countering Strategic Abandonment
* Daniel Sneider is Associate Director for Research at the Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. He thanks Mrinal Ravinder Menon
for research assistance.
2 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
I. Introduction
The security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is
the foundation for the architecture of strategic stability in Northeast Asia that has
endured for more than a half century. Along with the U.S. alliance with Japan, this
security architecture has maintained the balance of power despite vast geopolitical
changes, not least the end of the global Cold War. It provided an environment that
fostered spectacular economic growth and the institutionalization of democratic
governance.
The stability created under this strategic architecture is now challenged by a unique
combination of three developments—the rise of China, North Korea’s bid to become
a nuclear power, and the weakening of the United States in the wake of the Iraq War.
These events disturb the carefully crafted balance of power that was created during
the Cold War era. China’s growth as an economic and military power, combined with
its aspirations for regional leadership, creates an alternative pole of power to the
United States. The defiant decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) to test a nuclear device threatens the security of Korea and Japan and
opens the door to further proliferation in the region.
These two developments have been widely discussed among policymakers and experts
in the region and in the United States. But there has been little examination of the
dangerous dynamic between these events and the Iraq War. The deteriorating military
and political situation in Iraq and in the Middle East more broadly has significantly
weakened the United States in East Asia. It has swung public opinion against the
United States and, as collateral damage, undermined support for the alliances. The
focus of U.S. attention and resources on the Middle East feeds a perception that U.S.
interest in East Asia is declining. More profoundly, it encourages powers such as
China and Russia to assert more frequently and more boldly their desire for a more
multipolar power structure.
The war has also depleted the U.S. force structure in the Pacific, drawing all the U.S.
Army and Marine Corps ground forces committed to the Pacific theater into active
deployment in Iraq. The global redeployment of U.S. forces has already produced a
significant drop in force levels in Korea and plans are to move forces currently based
in Japan to bases in Guam and elsewhere. Although U.S. naval and air forces in the
Pacific remain at significant levels, it is not credible that the United States could
commit large numbers to the defense of Korea in the event of a major conflict.
It is impossible to know how this diminished capability has affected the thinking of the
North Korean leadership, but it seems likely that they have not overlooked this shift in
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resources. The perception of a United States bogged down in Iraq could only have
encouraged them to take the risk, one previously avoided, of testing a nuclear device.
The specter of a United States weakened in Iraq, facing a rising great power and an
unpredictable new nuclear state, feeds fears of abandonment in both the ROK and
Japan. In Japan there is growing concern that the United States is willing to reach an
agreement with the DPRK that leaves a small nuclear arsenal intact but contains the
problem of proliferation of nuclear materials or technology to what is seen as a more
serious threat of proliferation in Iran. This raises the danger of a separation of vital
national security interests between the two allies—for Japan, even a small nuclear
arsenal in North Korea poses an existential threat, given the density of its urban
populations. Japanese concerns about North Korea often are a surrogate for deeper
anxieties about the rise of China and apprehensions that the United States might seek
a partnership with China at the expense of Japan.
While it has been less visible, fears of abandonment have also been growing in the
ROK. These were sparked in part by the downsizing of the U.S. forces in Korea and
the decision to bring the Combined Forces Command to a close, as I will discuss in
more detail below. But, as in Japan, there is also a strategic worry about China’s
growing influence in the region and on the Korean peninsula in particular and,
secondarily, a concern about Japan’s growing military role. The possibility that Korea
may become caught between these two powers without a strong U.S. presence in the
region has emerged as an argument in some Korean circles for preserving the alliance
with the United States.
Historically, and it remains true today, fears of abandonment by the United States
have been paired with the fear of entanglement. Koreans and Japanese have worried
about being drawn into wider conflicts by their U.S. ally as a result of their security
commitments. That has been a persistent issue in Japan, for example, in the use of the
U.S. bases on Okinawa to support combat operations in Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea.
More recently this issue emerged in Korea in response to the U.S. desire for “strategic
flexibility” in using Korea-based forces for regional or global operations.
Entanglement fears draw upon the natural desire of both allies, and elites in both
countries, to free themselves from excessive dependency on the United States and to
assert greater independence in the formation of foreign and security policies. This has
been more evident in Korea in the past seven years, a time when Koreans have felt a
growing separation between their approach to containing North Korea and the policies
of the George W. Bush administration. But even in Japan, during a time when the
security alliance has been closer than ever before, Japanese policymakers have pushed
for more autonomy.
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In both countries, however, the fear of abandonment has historically been by far the
most powerful determinant of policy. Owing in part to the legacy of dependency and
to geopolitical isolation, both Koreans and Japanese have worried more about being
left alone than about being dragged into unwanted conflicts. Arguably, the Korean
and Japanese decisions to dispatch forces to Iraq and to support the war in Afghanistan
were driven more by this fear than by support for those wars. Korean and Japanese
policymakers needed, for different reasons, to keep the United States close and
understood that their support for U.S. policy in the Middle East would help accomplish
that goal.
The separation of U.S. security interests from those of its allies in Korea and Japan,
combined with a perception of the decline of U.S. strength and interest in East Asia,
creates the danger of strategic abandonment. The consequences of fear pf strategic
abandonment are multiple and should be of serious concern to U.S. policymakers, as
well as those who support the alliance system in East Asia. One consequence is to
propel Korea and Japan into a closer embrace of China, and potentially Russia. Another
possible outcome is to increase instability, including the risk of conflict arising out of
miscalculation.
Strategic abandonment fear is fed by, and in turn encourages, rising nationalism in
both Korea and Japan. The upsurge in nationalism already impacts the alliances with
the United States. Conservative Japanese nationalism feeds off increased tensions
with China over history issues, often accompanied by demands that the United States
take sides in such disputes. President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea tapped into
Korean nationalism in a manner that, whether intended or not, served to loosen ties
with the United States.
Perhaps the most serious danger posed by the fear of strategic abandonment is that
of nuclear proliferation, that Korea and Japan might seek to replace what is seen as a
degraded guarantee of extended deterrence from the United States with their own
nuclear capability. This may seem the least likely outcome of strategic abandonment,
given the domestic political, technical, and international restraints on both countries
going nuclear. But it is potentially the most worrisome development, and it is not
without precedent.
The dynamic between fears of entanglement and abandonment in our alliance
relationships in Northeast Asia is not unique. U.S. postwar alliances in Europe have
been characterized by the same pattern: allies have sought to maximize their role in
defining broad strategy toward the Soviet Union and now toward other adversaries
while they attempt to limit their obligations to carry out those policies. This is as true
of our alliance with Britain as it has been with Germany, and certainly France.
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Nuclear policy in Europe has in particular struggled with this pattern of alliance
relations. In response to the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe and the European allies’
concern about the reliability of the U.S. response, our allies sought assurance of
extended deterrence in the form of the deployment of U.S. intermediate nuclear forces
in Europe. But they also opted, in the case of Britain and France, for creation of an
independent nuclear deterrent. At the same time, our allies feared being dragged into
unwanted confrontation with the Soviets and pursued their own strategies of
engagement.
II. The Vietnam War Era: The Historical Precedent
The current convergence of developments in Northeast Asia—the rise of China, North
Korea’s nuclear challenge, and the weakening of U.S. power owing to the war in
Iraq—has a historical precedent in the Vietnam War era. During the period of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, there was also a
combination of a growing Chinese challenge, increased North Korean adventurism,
and a sense of U.S. weakness. This created a fear of abandonment among U.S. allies
in the ROK and Japan, a perception that produced a serious proliferation risk.
At the opening of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, revolutionary China was
already rising as a threat to regional stability. The Chinese were backing a bid for
power by the communists in Indonesia as well as encouraging the Vietnamese, Khmer,
and Lao insurgencies. In October 1964, the Chinese conducted their first test of a
nuclear warhead, followed in 1966 by the test of a missile-delivered warhead, and a
year later by the test of a hydrogen bomb. Together with growing evidence that
Beijing was at odds with its Soviet allies, particularly in the decision to pursue a nuclear
capability, these developments created visible unease about security, particularly in
Japan and, to a lesser extent, the ROK.
The security threat from the DPRK, which leaned toward Beijing in the growing
Sino-Soviet dispute, also escalated during this period. The DPRK leadership saw the
United States bogged down in Vietnam and the ROK weakened by the decision to
deploy elite units to assist the U.S. military campaign in Vietnam. They carried out a
series of actions, testing U.S. and Korean will—beginning with the commando assault
on the Blue House in 1968, followed two days later by the seizure of the USS Pueblo,
and also repeated attempts to assassinate President Park Chung-hee, the most
spectacular of which took place in Seoul in 1974.
The tide of U.S. fortunes in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet offensive of 1968 and
President Johnson’s subsequent decision not to seek reelection, began to feed a
perception in Northeast Asia of U.S. weakness and retreat.
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A secret assessment by a senior State Department official of Japanese attitudes
(Sneider 1968), entitled “Japan: Partner in Possible Disarray,” captured this shift:
Contributing to the current discontent has been the assumption of many
that [Prime Minister] Sato was acting not in Japan’s own interests but at
U.S. behest. But, more important, a good number of Japanese are having
second thoughts about U.S. staying power in Asia. U.S. balance of
payments difficulties, the Tet offensive, the Pueblo incident, domestic
disorders and the President’s March 31 speech are all cited as evidences
of U.S. weakness. In separate private conversations, the Governor of
the Bank of Japan Usami, Foreign Minister Miki and a leading
conservative friend of the U.S. each revealed doubts about our Vietnam
and Asian policies...
These frustrations with the U.S. have inevitably turned more and more
Japanese to brooding about the need for an “independent” Japanese
foreign policy—e.g. escaping from what Miki has called “excessive
dependence” on the U.S.
The growing Japanese fear of abandonment spurred talk of developing nuclear weapons,
particularly after the Chinese nuclear test. In a December 1964 conversation with
Edwin Reischauer, U.S. ambassador to Japan, ahead of his visit to Washington, Prime
Minister Sato launched into a discussion of nuclear defense, citing the example of the
British nuclear deterrent. “If the other fellow has nuclear weapons, it is only common
sense to have them oneself,” Sato said, citing Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the
United Kingdom. The Japanese public was not ready for this but would have to be
educated and the younger generation showed signs of going this way, he told
Reischauer (see Reischauer [1964]).
Sato told Johnson the next month in Washington that Japan should acquire nuclear
weapons in response to China’s nuclear capability. While Sato declared Japan’s three
non-nuclear principles in 1967—commitments not to manufacture, possess, or allow
the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan—he privately continued to raise the
possibility of going nuclear (Kase 2001).
Sato’s Cabinet Information Research Office commissioned a comprehensive study
of the nuclear option, which was carried out in two parts in 1968 and 1970. The first
part examined the technical, economic, and organizational issues related to developing
nuclear weapons, and the second part focused on the costs and benefits from a
strategic, political, and diplomatic perspective. The report concluded that, although
Japan was capable of developing the weapons, it would do irreparable damage to
U.S.-Japan security relations. Japan, the authors argued, could not afford to follow
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the French path. Japan was still better off continuing to depend on the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. But Japanese policymakers, not unlike their counterparts in Europe, were
concerned that the United States would not risk its own security to respond to a threat
mounted by a nuclear China against Japan alone.
To some extent, the talk of going nuclear was intended to force the United States to
strengthen its commitment to provide extended deterrence to Japan. It also helped
convince the United States that it needed to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty
and other steps designed to bolster the alliance in the eyes of the Japanese populace.
Those efforts were almost undermined by the Nixon “shocks”—the secret decision
to establish détente with China—which also reverberated in South Korea. Privately
officials in both countries were convinced that the United States had made deals with
the Chinese at their expense. “How long can we trust the United States?” President
Park asked in an off-the-record meeting with Korean reporters on the day Kissinger’s
secret trip to China was announced (Oberdorfer 2001, 13).
The impact of the Vietnam War was even more serious for the ROK. The North
Korean escalation shook the leadership in Seoul, which wanted to bring back its forces
from South Vietnam. Doubts about U.S. strength and commitment grew after newly
elected U.S. president, Richard Nixon, proclaimed the so-called Guam Doctrine in
1969, calling on America’s Asian allies to take more responsibility for their own defense.
The abrupt decision to withdraw the 7th Infantry Division from Korea in 1971, despite
strong opposition from President Park, was a turning point in undermining confidence
in the U.S. security guarantee. The U.S. retreat from Vietnam in 1975, followed by
newly elected President Jimmy Carter’s decision to withdraw the rest of U.S. ground
forces from Korea only deepened that fear of abandonment.
The South Korean government began a serious program to develop its own nuclear
weapons, part of a broader effort to seek greater defense autonomy and capability.
According to Park Chung-hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, in an interview with the
Monthly Chosun, Park took the initial steps to go nuclear in response to the U.S.
decision to pull out the 7th Division.1
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, citing a senior Korean official, the
planning to develop the capacity to construct a nuclear warhead may have begun in
1969, with the aim of completing it by the late 1970s. “Pak’s [Park’s] desire for
advanced weapons appears to be part of an overall effort to develop military strength
1. Hong Sung Gul’s paper (2002) is the most complete account of the South Korean nuclear weapons
program and the U.S. response.
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in the event US forces leave Korea,” the CIA (1974) concluded. “He is signaling—
and may have intended his remarks to reach US officials—an ability and desire to
assert Korea’s military independence from the US and implying that Seoul will be
able to stand alone against the North in the foreseeable future.”
The lack of a clear U.S. policy regarding its long-term military presence in Korea
drove the nuclear program, U.S. officials concluded. “These uncertainties lead President
Park into preparations for what he sees as our eventual withdrawal, preparations
which include internal repression and plans for the development of nuclear weapons,”
a secret cable from the U.S. Embassy (Sneider 1975) warned in June 1975. “They
also induce optimism on the part of North Korea about our withdrawal and doubts in
Japan about our credibility and about the future of Korea.”
The United States forcefully intervened over several years, blocking Seoul’s efforts
to acquire nuclear technology from France and Canada while threatening to break off
the security alliance itself. But the United States also compensated Seoul with support
for its nuclear energy program, access to advanced conventional weapons technology,
a slowing of plans to withdraw U.S. troops, and strengthening extended deterrence.
The creation of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978 as an integrated
headquarters command between U.S. and ROK forces was also prompted by the
need to counter fears of abandonment.
The United States also reconsidered plans to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from
Korea. A CIA report (1977) on the implications of withdrawing those weapons warned,
“Seoul will read the total withdrawal of nuclear weapons as evidence of US intent to
forgo their use in a future conflict.” President Park might resume the nuclear weapons
program if there was any further “reduction in the credibility of the US alliance,” the
memo said.
III. Abandonment Fears after the North Korean Nuclear Test
The partially successful test of a nuclear device by the DPRK on 9 October 2006
triggered a major crisis of confidence on the security system in Northeast Asia. Despite
repeated threats from the United States and its security allies in the ROK and Japan
that this constituted an “unacceptable” step, the DPRK leadership proceeded with
fanfare. And while the Chinese government also warned against this step, there was
considerable concern in Tokyo and to a lesser extent in Washington and Seoul that it
had not seriously tried to halt the nuclear test.
The diplomatic process that has unfolded since the test seemed to only confirm the
North Korean belief that it could not only survive the immediate international response
but that its negotiating leverage would be enhanced. The 13 February 2007 agreement
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that followed the resumption of negotiations seemed to confirm the North Korean
calculation. It may of course lead to full denuclearization of the DPRK. Unfortunately
there is also reason to assume that the DPRK will cling to the enhanced political and
military power it gained from even a small and unproven nuclear arsenal. In any case,
until diplomacy yields a different outcome, we must face the reality of Pyongyang’s
nuclear breakthrough.
The U.S, ROK, and Japan are now compelled to consider the implications of a nuclear
North Korea. In the case of the ROK, as discussed below, the initial response has
been largely to add impetus to the engagement policies of the Roh Moo-hyun
administration. The convening of a second North-South summit in Pyongyang in October
2007 clearly reflected the belief of the Roh administration that a rapid deepening of
economic, political, and even military engagement with the North offered the only
answer to the nuclear crisis. Fears of entanglement—most specifically the fear of
being dragged into a conflict on the peninsula as a result of the actions of the United
States and others—remain strong. But there is also a palpable fear of abandonment
that has also been touched off, one that is likely to find greater expression after the
upcoming presidential election in the ROK.
Before looking at the Korean response, we need to understand the reaction in Japan.
The nuclear test is clearly a catalyst for an eruption of strategic anxiety in Japan, most
interestingly expressed in the most widespread and public discussion of the nuclear
option in the postwar period. This discussion does not by any means lead to the
conclusion that Japan will go nuclear at any time in the near future,2 but it does
indicate a growing danger of strategic abandonment that undermines alliance relations
and stability in the region.
This discussion began following the North Korean missile test in July and the reports
that a nuclear test might be imminent. While a greater sense of threat and rising
nationalism fed this public debate, the main driver has been a fear of U.S. abandonment.
“There are countries with nuclear weapons in Japan’s vicinity,” former prime minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone said on 5 September (Kyodo News Service 2006), announcing a
study of Japan’s security options to be conducted by the Institute for International
Policy Studies (IIPS), a think tank that he founded. “We are currently dependent on
U.S. nuclear weapons (as a deterrent) but it is not necessarily known whether the
U.S. attitude will continue.”
The Asahi Shimbun 14 October 2006 reported that Nakasone stated that, while
maintaining the three non-nuclear principles, Japan “should consider the nuclear issue
2. For the most up-to-date and thorough discussion of this issue, see Hughes (2007).
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in order to ensure we are prepared for the possibility of a major change in international
society. By ‘major change’ we are thinking of such extreme cases as the United
States renouncing the protection of alliance partners under its nuclear umbrella or the
complete collapse of the US-Japan alliance.”
The focus on North Korea is to some extent a barely disguised, but more politically
acceptable, reaction to the rise of China, including its military buildup. According to
Takashi Kawakami (2007), who is directing the IIPS study, the current situation is an
echo of the response to China’s nuclear tests in the 1960s. Japanese policymakers
are not aiming at going nuclear themselves as much as seeking guarantees of extended
deterrence to calm fears of abandonment.
“In the future,” says Kawakami (2007), “Japan might be faced with abandonment by
the US if the US chooses to get close to China.” The nuclear discussion in Japan is
driven by a perception of threat—of a Korean peninsula unified with nuclear weapons
and uncertainty about China—but the most serious issue is “nervousness about which
direction the US is taking in the future.” There are increasing concerns in Japanese
policy circles, he reports, about a situation resembling the post-Vietnam era, with an
inward-looking United States and a Democratic administration led by Hillary Clinton
that is “inclined to abandon Japan.”3
Conservative media in Japan carried even more lurid discussions of Japan’s vulnerability
and the need to explore the nuclear option. Japanese security experts tend to dismiss
this as chatter, not a serious discussion of what moving toward nuclear capability
might mean. But the talk reflects a growing strategic separation that is developing
between Japan and the United States.
Those concerns prompted Japanese government officials to privately ask the United
States for a public restatement of the extended deterrence commitment.4 This request
was made when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan on 18 October
2006, less then two weeks after the North Korean test.
“I confirmed with Secretary Rice that the U.S. commitment to providing deterrence
under the Japan-U.S. security system will be maintained,” then foreign minister Aso
Taro said at a joint press conference (DOS 2006). “That is to say that the U.S.
3. The Japanese press seized upon Hillary Clinton’s essay (2007) on her foreign policy views as
evidence of that tilt. In regard to Asia, the essay said that the U.S. relationship with China “may be the
most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century.” Japan, which used to have that label,
barely rated a mention in the essay.
4. This request was related by senior Japanese Foreign Ministry officials in an interview with the author.
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commitment to defend Japan under the Japan-U.S. security system will be maintained
under any circumstances.”
Rice responded (DOS 2006) that “the United States has the will and the capability to
meet the full range—and I underscore full range—of its deterrent and security
commitments to Japan.”
Japanese concerns were not entirely assuaged by this statement. Conservative
Japanese politicians repeatedly questioned the credibility of the U.S. security guarantees
to Japan. Liberal Democratic Party leader Shoichi Nakagawa called for a debate on
the nuclear option. “What is the nuclear umbrella?” Nakagawa asked in an interview
in the magazine Shukan Bunshun on 2 November 2006. “We should give thought to
such a fundamental matter. . . . Thinking there is no need even for debate because of
the Japan-U.S. alliance is laughable. Is the US that kind?”
Conservative commentators also linked this to the China threat. Suppose China
attacked the Senkaku Islands, the island group in the East China Sea that is disputed
territory with China and the location of major oil and gas fields, asked former
ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, a close adviser to former prime minister Shinzo Abe,
in a report in the Sankei Shimbun of 9 November 2006. Would the United States
come to the defense of Japan? If Japan had nuclear weapons, would it cause China to
think twice, Ozakaki wondered.
Within a fairly limited circle of Japanese security experts, there is the beginning of a
debate over options. The nuclear option itself is widely criticized as both
counterproductive in its impact on Japan’s security and ineffective in dealing with
threats. Almost all Japanese analysts rule out any path that would be opposed by the
United States. There is some discussion of adopting what is called the “Two and a
Half Non-Nuclear Principles”—or just two—which refers to either accepting the
movement of U.S. nuclear weapons through Japan more openly or actual deployment
of those weapons into Japan. This is seen as a means of locking in the nuclear umbrella.
Those views remain in a small minority, but worries about the credibility of extended
deterrence are considerable and Japanese officials continue to press for public
statements to reassure their public. As recently as May 2007, in the Joint Statement
of the Security Consultative Committee (DOS 2007) of the two nations, the “U.S.
reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities—both nuclear and non-
nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended deterrence
and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.”
Despite these reassurances, Japanese fears of abandonment have actually accelerated,
in large part owing to the engagement of U.S. diplomacy with the DPRK. Japanese
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policymakers, echoed by the media, complain that the United States will make a deal
that leaves unresolved Japan’s bilateral issues with the DPRK—the abduction of
Japanese nationals. More seriously, Japanese policymakers worry that the United
States is ready to accept a freeze on the North’s nuclear program that will severely
restrict its ability to proliferate nuclear weapons and technology to Iran but will leave
intact a small arsenal and missile delivery systems sufficient to threaten Japan.
The recent debate over the extension of Japan’s military role in the Indian Ocean has
reflected these feelings of fear of abandonment. Asked whether the United States is
the only country that would come to the defense of Japan, a prominent lawmaker
from the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, Kazuhiro Haraguchi, responded in
the Tokyo Shimbun of 9 September 2007:
That is not true. Bogged down in the Iraq war, the United States was not
able to take military action following a nuclear test by North Korea. The
United States is trying to de-list North Korea as a state sponsor of
terrorism despite the issue of Japanese abducted by North Korea. Japan
is being ignored despite its commitment to the United States. No one
spares time or energy for the weak follower.
The Iraq War has also served to feed those who seek greater independence in the
formulation of Japanese foreign policy, though still within the framework of the alliance.
Democratic Party of Japan leader Ichiro Ozawa led the opposition to extension of
Japan’s maritime deployment in large part on the grounds that it had become conflated
with operations in support of the Iraq War, a war without international justification and
support.
“The United States is always overconfident of its own unilateralism, and it does not
notice that its actions are disrupting the international community, starting with the
United Nations,” Ozawa (2007) wrote recently. “If Japan is to really be an ally of the
US (and it is the same for other allies), it should hold its head up high and strive to give
proper advice to the US.”
Ozawa (2007) made it clear that he saw the Iraq War as a manifestation of that
unilateralism:
The Iraq war was carried out by the US and British forces launching
strikes. . . . In the UN, France, supposed to be an ally, was opposed.
Russia was also opposed, and so was China. In spite of that, the US and
Britain on their own accord launched the Iraq war. Moreover, it was
revealed later that there was no truth to Iraq possessing weapons of
mass destruction, claimed as the reason for the war. Both the US and
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Britain had no choice but to admit that their justification for the Iraq war
had been lost.
IV. Korea: Between Entanglement and Abandonment
Historically, for South Korea, the fear of abandonment has been the dominant factor
in determining security policy and the approach to the alliance with the United States.
U.S. proposals to reduce or withdraw its armed forces from Korea have been met in
the past with alarm and protest. And while the desire for Koreanization of the country’s
defense capabilities has been a constant of defense planning since the Park Chung-
hee era, Koreans have hesitated to take full responsibility for their own security.
This historical position has changed significantly in the past decade as a result of
democratization, the movement toward engagement and rapprochement with the
DPRK, and the growth of Korean nationalism, especially among the younger generation.
Fear of entrapment has taken the place of fear of abandonment to some extent. The
clearest expression of this is a belief that the United States would unilaterally carry
out a preemptive war against North Korea—a scenario that was widely discussed in
Korean media in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. The U.S. pressure for Korean
involvement in the Iraq conflict also prompted opposition on the grounds that this was
entangling Korea in a war it did not truly support.
“The balance of the two fears in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship is also perceived
differently across generations,” argues sociologist Lee Sook-jong (2005), a former
senior fellow at Korea’s Sejong Institute. “The fear of abandonment is less acute
among younger South Koreans, perhaps because they tend to believe that the United
States will never abandon South Korea due to its strategic value. By contrast, older
South Koreans fear that the anti-U.S. voices of South Korean youth and policy discord
between Washington and Seoul regarding North Korea’s nuclear problem will induce
the United States to rethink the strategic value of South Korea and no longer commit
to the country’s defense.”
The desire for greater autonomy appeared to be the main motivator for the Roh Moo-
hyun administration’s advocacy of defense reforms aimed at greater self-reliance as
well as the demand to transfer wartime operational control to the ROK, bringing the
CFC structure to a close. Those demands coincided with U.S. plans to restructure its
forces in Korea. The initial goal, discussed within the framework of the Future of the
Alliance (FOTA) talks, was to relocate U.S. forces in Korea away from their “trip-
wire” position on the front lines to a position south of the Han River. The intent was to
give the forces greater mobility and to consolidate the U.S. base imprint and reduce
conflicts over the U.S. military presence.
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But this FOTA discussion was overtaken, in response to the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq
War, by a larger global redeployment of U.S. forces under the direction of U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This led to a U.S. decision in June 2004,
undertaken without significant consultation, to reduce its ground forces in Korea by
one-third (12,500 troops out of 37,000). The 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
was deployed to Iraq in the summer of 2004 and at least one brigade of the 2nd
Infantry Division has been regularly rotating since then into Iraq. The decision to
station the 2nd Infantry Division south of Seoul now appears to be less a matter of
coping with a North Korean attack than of facilitating the use of the principal U.S.
ground force unit on the peninsula for missions outside of Korea. At the same time,
the Defense Department proposed to accelerate the timetable for the transfer of
wartime command to 2009, much faster than the Koreans themselves had proposed.
Some South Korean officials have suggested that Rumsfeld was motivated in part by
his reaction to South Korean anti-Americanism. According to former presidential
adviser Moon Chung-in, Rumsfeld shouted “God damn it! Get them out!” when
watching a television news broadcast of U.S. military police personnel bleeding after
being hit by a stone thrown by student protestors.5 Rumsfeld’s irritation with Korean
nationalism was not a secret, but it seems likely that this shift has been a matter of
necessity more than of choice—it is dictated by the shortage of ground forces available
for duty in Iraq.
The combination of the U.S. withdrawal of its forces and the dissolution of the CFC
began, however, to revive the fears of abandonment that had been subsumed in the
public mind, and certainly in the policies of the Roh administration, by the fear of
entanglement. These concerns were most visibly voiced in the conservative media,
mostly by policy elites and by leaders of the opposition Grand National Party (GNP).
The North Korea ballistic missile tests in July 2006 unleashed this wave, and the
nuclear test in October gave it fuller throat.
“A full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is now a foregone conclusion,” wrote
conservative columnist Kim Dae-joong (2006). “It is probably correct to assume that
if a nuclear war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. will not throw its ground
troops here, though there could be Air Force support.”
Opposition to the transfer of wartime command also began to surface during that
summer, initially from former military officers, in anticipation of the annual meeting of
defense ministers scheduled for October 2006 in Washington, D.C., when a timetable
5. This incident, originally reported in Dong-a Ilbo on 28 August 2004, was cited in Armed Forces and
Society (2007).
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and road map for the command transfer was to be finalized. In September, for example,
160 former diplomats, including three former cabinet ministers, issued a joint statement
(reported in the Korea Times of 11 September 2006), arguing that Korea needed
more time to strengthen its defense capabilities and to build public consensus before
taking back command authority.
The conservative and elite protests forced the Roh administration to extend the date
for the command transfer. The allies had agreed to a flexible transition timeline,
between 15 October 2009 and 15 March 2012. But the North Korean nuclear test in
October undermined public confidence in South Korea’s ability to take up much of the
burden of its own defense.
A resolution adopted in February 2007 by the National Assembly’s Defense Committee,
under the leadership of the GNP, urged a halt to the transfer until the nuclear crisis
was fully settled. Nearly half the country’s lawmakers sent a letter to this effect a day
before the defense chiefs of the ROK and the United States were set to meet to
finalize the transfer date. “North Korea’s ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons pose
a grave threat to the security of Northeast Asia as well as on the peninsula,” said
Rep. Hwang Jin-ha, a former military officer and leader of the GNP initiative on this
issue; his statement was reported in the Korea Times of 22 February 2007.
The defense chiefs finally agreed to set the transfer date back to 2012, but the issue
has still not died. In a joint statement, a group of 57 former senior defense officials
called for the nullification of the agreement. They called on the next government to
reassess the transfer timeline on the basis of security conditions on the peninsula.
“The Republic of Korea now faces a daunting security challenge from North Korea’s
first-ever nuclear bomb test last October,” the statement, reported in the Korea Times
on 28 February 2007, said. “But the government is pushing for dismantling the ROK-
US Combined Forces Command, the most effective security formula to deter an
attack from North Korea and ensure overwhelming U.S. reinforcements in the case
of war.” The GNP has pledged to review the plan, though not necessarily to roll it
back entirely, if the party wins the December 2007 presidential election.
Behind these statements is a debate among Korean security experts on the implications
for South Korea’s security of a nuclear-armed North Korea. The Roh administration
has embraced a view popular among some Korean specialists that a North Korean
nuclear capability is not a significant threat to South Korea itself: Pyongyang would
not target the South but rather sees the weapon as a deterrent against possible U.S.
attack and for use as a bargaining chip.
In a lengthy analysis published in 2004, former defense ministry arms control expert,
Cheon Seong-whun, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National
16 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
Unification, challenged that conventional wisdom. Although North Korea would not
be able to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, in
fear of massive retaliation, “North Korea might feel free to intimidate or attack South
Korea with nuclear weapons,” Cheon (2004, 56) wrote.
The defense policy expert (Cheon 2004, 56–57) expressed growing doubt about the
validity of U.S. extended deterrence, especially in light of tensions between the allies,
a view not confined to him alone:
South Korea is officially under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. . . . This
means that if attacked by Pyongyang, Washington will exercise full
options including possible use of nuclear weapons to defend Seoul. But
South Koreans’ confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been
diminishing. . . . Under the circumstances, North Korea is much less
likely to worry about nuclear retaliation from the United States in defense
of South Korea and thus, can fully enjoy its freedom to take advantage
of nuclear-related options from threat manipulation to actual use.
Cheon suggests that the North Koreans could even demonstrate their capability in the
midst of a crisis to force a South Korean capitulation.
Cheon also echoed wider worries about Japan’s military role. He suggested that the
United States could encourage Japan to acquire nuclear weapons as a counter to a
North Korean nuclear capability or to prod China into action. “Japan’s nuclear weapon
in excuse of nuclear-armed North Korea is a more ominous outcome than North
Korea’s nuclear weapon and should be prevented from happening,” Cheon (2004, 69)
wrote.
Some Korean security analysts link the North Korean threat to U.S. weakness resulting
from its involvement in the Middle East. “People still worry that North Korea would
feel more at liberty to challenge and intimidate South Korea with its superiority in
weapons of mass destruction and missiles,” wrote Hong Kyu-dok (2006, 119), a policy
adviser to the ROK army chief of staff and the defense and foreign ministries. “Only
few believe that the U.S. would be able to retaliate against Pyongyang since it is
bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Among more conservative Korean analysts, similar in some ways to their ideological
counterparts in Japan, the 13 February agreement in the six-party talks was criticized
for potentially leaving in place a nuclear capability that did not threaten the United
States but posed a threat to South Korea and Japan.
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“The U.S. may deny it, but we feel betrayed by America,” wrote commentator Kim
Dae-joong (2007b). “The U.S. is starting to reveal that it is committed to the protection
of South Korea in form only, and that it does to wish to undertake any substantive
duties. . . . The central axis of the Korean problem is moving away from one tripartite
structure—of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan—to another: the U.S., China, and
North Korea.”
Kim argued then and in a subsequent column (Kim 2007a) that South Korea now had
to reconsider the nuclear option for itself:
We need the defense equipment that allows us to cope with North
Korea’s nuclear weapons. That means we need to reconsider our position
on nuclear weapons.
We are surrounded by countries that either have or are capable of building
nuclear arms. Because it has nuclear weapons, North Korea has been
able to survive and negotiate with the big powers. Of course, China also
has nuclear weapons, and the stark reality is that Japan, with a nuclear
reprocessing plant, is capable of making nuclear arms any time it needs
to. In addition, if we cannot expect the support of the nuclear umbrella
provided by the U.S., we could be left helpless at a crossroads in East
Asia amidst a forest of nuclear weapons. . . . As long as it tolerates
North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the U.S. has no justification for
preventing any country that is desperate to survive from developing its
own.
This is a view at the end of the spectrum to be sure. Others suggest that extended
deterrence can be reinforced through the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into
the Korean peninsula, an idea that also has little backing. But these views hint at a
broader dialogue that has been somewhat buried out of sight, other than in conservative
newspapers, by the ability of the current administration to influence public discourse.
This does not suggest there is a shift of opinion against the policy of engagement with
North Korea. Both the ruling and opposition parties broadly support that basic strategy.
But belief in economic engagement does not necessarily clash with the sense of a
growing fear of abandonment and apprehension of about losing the security and stability
provided by the alliance system.
This is reflected, somewhat indirectly, in a subtle swing of South Korean public opinion.
The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007) conducted a new survey of some 47 countries
during the spring of 2007. The poll offers comparative data across countries and also
compares with previous polling data in Korea taken in 2003 and 2002, when anti-U.S.
opinions were at their height.
18 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
U.S. favorability has risen significantly in Korea—from 46 percent in 2003 to 58
percent in 2007, comparable with the view of the United States in Japan and India. It
is interesting, though, that this is a differentiated view as Koreans by large margins do
not support the U.S.-led war on terrorism; neither do they have much confidence in
President George W. Bush.
At the same time, unfavorable views of China are growing in Korea—from 31 percent
in 2002 to 42 percent in 2007. China’s economic growth in particular is seen as a “bad
thing” for Korea by 60 percent of respondents. For contrast, the Japanese, although
they have an even more unfavorable view of China, tend to see China’s economic
growth as a good thing for their country.
The presidential election campaign in South Korea seems to also reflect this shift of
opinion, with the conservative GNP candidate Lee Myung-bok holding a commanding
lead in polls, with a second conservative candidate also commanding large support. At
this writing, the vote has not yet taken place so it is too early to be sure if these trends
will continue. But it is certainly possible that the next Blue House administration will
be closer to the views of those Koreans for whom strategic abandonment is a key
issue.
V. Conclusion: Countering Strategic Abandonment
U.S. policymakers have begun to explore the implications of the strategic disaster by
the Bush administration in Iraq, focusing most of all on the region itself. At an earlier
stage of the conflict, the impact on U.S. alliance partnerships was mostly examined in
the context of Europe. When it comes to East Asia, analysts have tended to comment
broadly on the problem of neglect, the way the Iraq War has sucked up all the attention
of senior officials.
Less attention has been paid to the corrosive effect of the Iraq War, and the perception
of U.S. weakness that it creates, on our alliances in Northeast Asia with the ROK
and Japan. In part, this effect was concealed by the apparent support for the war by
our allies, both of whom have supplied forces on the ground and logistical support to
the war effort. As we have discussed above, however, that support was driven in
large part by a deeper fear of U.S. abandonment and a desire to ensure U.S. support
for Korean and Japanese policy goals in the region.
The perception of U.S. weakness, of resources and attention focused on the Middle
East at the expense of vital interests in Asia, has intersected with the visible rise of
Chinese power and authority, especially in the region, and the inability of the United
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States to halt North Korea’s assertion of its status as a nuclear weapons state. This
combination has fed a growing fear of abandonment, which coexists alongside the
fear of becoming entangled by the United States in unwanted conflicts.
The fear of abandonment is not a new phenomenon in the U.S. alliance relationship
with the ROK and Japan. We saw a similar convergence at the time of the Vietnam
War when the belief was widespread that the United States was in retreat from Asia
as well as weakened by the long war in Southeast Asia. Then too, the alliance structure
in Northeast Asia was challenged by China, which crossed the nuclear threshold in
the mid-1960s, and by an aggressive North Korea.
The stability and security provided by the alliance architecture in Northeast Asia is
now threatened by this growing sense of strategic abandonment. We define strategic
abandonment as the fear of abandonment combined with a sense of separation of
strategic interests. In Korea, the sense of abandonment has been driven in recent
years by policies that appear to downgrade the relevance of the alliance to the security
of the country. But even in Japan, where there is less questioning of the validity of the
alliance, there are also growing feelings of separation between Japan and the United
States.
Strategic abandonment leads directly to uncertainty and instability—uncertainty about
how the United States might respond to security threats and instability as rising powers
and other actors challenge the current balance of power. At the extreme end, strategic
abandonment can lead—as it did in the Vietnam War era—to nuclear proliferation on
the part of U.S. allies who no longer feel secure about the guarantees of extended
deterrence.
Strategic abandonment is a problem with a built-in cure, provided that all the partners
in the alliance system still desire the stability and security that system provided. It
requires concerted efforts at consultation and the formation of common policy at the
diplomatic, political, and military levels of the alliances. There has been a curious
absence of that kind of consultation, particularly in the ROK-U.S. alliance but also
with Japan and at the level of trilateral coordination among the ROK, Japan, and the
United States. Such consultations could include:
• A thorough reexamination of the timetable for command transfer in Korea,
including linking that timetable more clearly to a joint study of the military and
political conditions on the peninsula. This does not mean that the goal of
transfer needs to be reversed—only that we should have the strategic
discussion that should have accompanied that decision;
• Discussions at a high level held by the United States with both the ROK and
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Japan about the policy of extended deterrence. What are the expectations of
our allies; under what circumstances would deterrent forces be used; what
are the options, both conventional and nuclear, that might be employed to
provide extended deterrence; and what other measures, including the transfer
of advanced defense technology, would aid deterrence; and
• A senior-level strategic dialogue among the United States, the ROK, and
Japan, held with the goal of exchanging views on the global and regional
situation, problems of common interest, and areas of trilateral cooperation,
including on issues such as alternative energy development and development
assistance.
During the next year, leadership will change in the United States and in the ROK, and
perhaps in Japan as well. Whatever the outcome of the political process, this will
create a moment to counter the drift toward strategic abandonment. We should not
miss that opportunity.
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